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SYDENSTRICKER v. UNIP UNCH PRODUCTS, INC.:
CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNITY UNDER
MANDOLIDIS THEORY
Workmen's compensation was developed as a compromise system in which
both the employer and employee surrendered certain benefits in return for
others. Historically, the first workmen's compensation statutes had, as their
primary objectives, prompt and predetermined benefits at adequate levels, re-
lief from the uncertainty of recovery, elimination of costly litigation, and lim-
ited employer liability.1 In effect, the employee relinquished his common law
right to sue his employer in return for a prompt, though limited, sum of
money. The employer gave up his common law defenses and accepted liability
without fault in exchange for the elimination of the risk of a large tort award.
2
This absolute but limited liability, called the doctrine of exclusive remedy, be-
came the basic principle upon which all of the various systems of workmen's
compensation were founded.
One of the most controversial questions in the area of workmen's compen-
sation arises when an employee is injured due to the concurrent negligence of
his employer and a third party. If an employee receives his statutory benefits
from the employer and then recovers a large damages award from the third
party, should the employer be liable to the third party under a theory of con-
tribution? Most jurisdictions hold that a joint tortfeasor employer is immune
from a third party contribution suit because he is initially immune from tort
liability to his injured.employee by virtue of the exclusive remedy doctrine.4 A
number of states,5 however, provide exceptions to exclusivity for employer mis-
conduct. West Virginia, for example, revokes an employer's immunity to law-
suit under circumstances of intentional employer misconduct which results in
injury or death.6 In the recent case of Sydenstricker v. Unipunch Products,
Inc.,7 the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals considered the effect of
such an exception on the principles of contribution and indemnity, and con-
cluded that third parties may bring actions against the employer when such
misconduct is present.
Sydenstricker arose as the result of a certified question proposed by the
United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia. The
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals was asked to decide whether a manu-
facturer, who had been sued by an employee who was injured while using the
manufacturer's product, could bring a third party action against the plaintiff's
I Vieweg, Erosion of the Exclusive Remedy Doctrine Actions Against the Employer, 17 Fo-
RUM 422 (1981).
2 Tomita, The Exclusive Remedy of Workers' Compensation for Intentional Torts of the Em:
player: Johns-Manville v. Superior Court, 18 CAL. W.L. REV. 27 (1981).
3 Vieweg, supra note 1, at 422.
4 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMENS's COMPENSATION § 76.20 (1982).
5 See Vieweg, supra note 1, at 427.
6 Mandolidis v. Elkins Industries, Inc., 246 S.E.2d 907 (W. Va. 1978).
7 288 S.E.2d 511 (W. Va. 1982).
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employer under the theory of either implied indemnity or contribution.8 The
plaintiff employee alleged that certain products used by him were negligently
designed, manufactured, and distributed.9 The employee sued four defendants
in their capacity as manufacturers of a product and its component parts. Two
of these defendants, Unipunch Products, Inc. and Niagara Machine and Tool
Works, brought separate third party complaints against the employer, Terrell
Tool and Die Corporation. The two manufacturers asserted liability on Ter-
rell's part for contribution and indemnity, alleging negligence and carelessness
in: 1) failing to provide a safe place to work; 2) failing to adopt and furnish
adequate safety devices; 3) misusing the product by disregarding written rec-
ommendations provided at the time of sale; 4) using the product beyond its
capacity; and 5) modifying the product by adding a component part. Unipunch
and Niagara alleged that these particular items constituted wilful, wanton, and
reckless misconduct on the part of Terrell, thus excepting the employer from
the doctrine of exclusive remedy.10
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, answering the certified
question in the affirmative,"" held that the deliberate intent exception con-
tained in the West Virginia Workmen's Compensation Act 2 would permit
manufacturers to bring a third party action against an employer under the the-
ory of contribution. Such an action would be based upon allegations that the
employer was guilty of wilful, wanton, and reckless misconduct or intentional
acts toward the plaintiff employee. Thus, the right of a plaintiff to recover
from an employer beyond the limits of workmen's compensation, as defined in
Mandolidis, has been extended to third parties in actions for contribution or
indemnity against the employer.
A logical result of Sydenstricker will be employer exposure to increased
liability in work-related injuries. West Virginia has long recognized the doc-
trine of contribution. 3 Based on principles of equity and common or joint lia-
bility on the part of joint tortfeasors to an injured plaintiff, contribution calls
for a fair and just division of losses. If one party pays more than his share of a
common obligation, thin that party may recover from the others the payment
of their respective shares.'4 This right was later extended to allow a tortfeasor
to bring in as a third party defendant a fellow joint tortfeasor to share by way
of contribution in the verdict recovered by the plaintiff.0
In Belcher v. J.H. Fletcher and Co.,' 6 however, the exclusive remedy doc-
trine was held to bar the contribution claim of a manufacturer against the em-
6 Id. at 512.
9 Id. at 514.
10 Id.
I1 Id.
12 W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2 (1981).
23 Payne v. Charleston Nat'l Bank, 112 W. Va. 251, 252, 164 S.E. 252, 253 (1932); Hutcherson
v. Slate, 105 W. Va. 184, 190, 142 S.E. 444, 447 (1928); Buskirk v. Sanders, 70 W. Va. 363, 370, 73
S.E. 937, 940 (1912).
14 Id.
" See Haynes v. City of Nitro, 240 S.E.2d 544, 550 (W. Va. 1977).
,6 498 F. Supp. 629, 631 (S.D. W. Va. 1980).
[Vol. 85
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ployer. The district court reasoned that to allow recovery beyond the pre-
scribed statutory limits would totally undermine the purpose of the
Workmen's Compensation Act. That purpose, as defined by West Virginia case
law, was to release both the employer and employee from the often burden-
some common law rules of liability and damages. 17 Employers would be pro-
tected from the expense and unpredictability of litigation, while employees
would be compensated for their injuries without the burdensome requirement
of proving common law negligence. The legislative intent was to provide a sim-
ple, expeditious method of resolving disputed claims s by providing a statutory
right to compensation. This right was substituted for a common law cause of
action and all civil liability. All statutes are controlling, and all rights, reme-
dies, and procedures are exclusive.19 In effect, the intent of the interpreted
statutes was to grant an employer who subscribed to the Workmen's Compen-
sation fund immunity from any common law action and to provide the em-
ployee a statutory benefit scheme as an exclusive remedy.
But West Virginia is one of a few states that recognizes an exception to
the exclusive remedy doctrine. This exception, outlined in West Virginia Code
§ 23-4-2 (1981), was substantially broadened in Mandolidis,20 in which wilful,
wanton, and reckless misconduct or a deliberate and intentional act were held
to deprive an employer of his immunity from suit and subject him to liability
beyond the limits of workmen's compensation. It is this deliberate intent basis
upon which the court built the Sydenstricker decision; a basis upon which em-
ployers are already being subjected to additional litigation and increased
liability."1
The problem of whether to allow contribution is one of the most signifi-
cant issues arising out of job-related injuries.2 2 The majority of jurisdictions
hold that a joint tortfeasor employer is immune from a third party contribu-
tion suit because he is initially immune from tort liability to his injured em-
ployee. This point has been summarized by Professor Arthur Larson, the noted
authority on workmen's compensation:
17 Jones v. Laird Foundation, Inc., 156 W. Va. 479, 489, 195 S.E.2d 821, 827 (1973) (Sprouse,
J., concurring).
18 Mitchell v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 256 S.E.2d 1, 9 (W. Va. 1979).
19 Bailes v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 152 W. Va. 210, 212, 161 S.E.2d 261, 263
(1968).
"G 246 S.E.2d at 914.
21 See Note, In Wake of Mandolidis: A Case Study of Recent Trials Brought Under the
Mandolidis Theory, 84 W. VA. L. REv. 893 (1982).
1 Other jurisdictions have also struggled with this problem:
It is difficult to reconcile the statutes without producing an unfair result. It seems
inequitable to hold that a third party is liable for an injured employee's total damages
without a right to contribution when the employer may have been causally negligent, but
the language of the [statute] compels this result. It would be equally inequitable to im-
pose additional liability to a third party on the employer when the workmen's compensa-
tion statute imposes an absolute, though limited, liability on the part of the employer to
an injured employee.
Note, Employer Liability to Third Parties Under the Workmen's Compensation and Compara-
tive Negligence Statutes, 26 U. KA. L. Rzv. 485, 492 (1978) (footnote omitted).
19831
3
Yurko: Sydenstricker v. Unipunch Products, Inc.: Contribution and Indemn
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1983
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
The great majority of jurisdictions have held that the employer whose con-
curring negligence contributed to the employee's injury cannot be sued or
joined by the third party as a joint tortfeasor, whether under contribution stat-
utes or at common law. The ground is a simple one: the employer is not jointly
liable to the employee in tort; therefore he cannot be a joint tortfeasor.2 '
Before the advent of workmen's compensation systems, workers recovered
compensatory damages in a rather small percentage of cases. 24 The employer
could raise numerous defenses in a suit at common law; the absence of negli-
gence, contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and the fellow servant
rule25 are a few that were commonly used. As industrialization increased, so
did the number of industrial accidents. Since most of the wage losses were
borne by the workers themselves, public opinion demanded a more equitable
arrangement. As a result, legislatures passed workmen's compensation statutes
to assure a minimum level of compensation without the requirement for litiga-
tion.26 In return for accepting the idea of liability without fault, employers
were granted immunity from lawsuits and limited liability.
Despite the strong sentiment for keeping the compensation system as it is
now, an appealing argument can be made that the abolition of exclusive rem-
edy requires a corresponding extension of employer liability in actions for con-
tribution or indemnity. A recent upsurge in products liability lawsuits has seen
the cost of liability insurance soar dramatically. The number of workplace in-
jury cases has risen and ever larger damages awards are being recovered.2
7
Strict liability and the abolition of many of the common law defenses available
to manufacturers have unfairly increased the burden which they must bear."5
23 Larson, supra note 4, at § 76.20.
24 Comment, The Exclusive Liability Provision in Workmen's Compensation: An Overly
Harsh Penalty for Third Parties or a Necessary Shield for Negligent Employers? 17 IDAHO L.
REv. 583, 586 (1981).
25 For an explanation of these defenses, see W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs
416-27, 439-57, 525-37 (4th ed. 1971).
26 Comment, supra note 24, at 587. An excerpt from former Governor Henry Drury Hatfield's
speech to the legislature shows that West Virginia's experience with industrial accidents was simi-
lar to that throughout the country.
In harmony with the advance of civilization and our duty to our neighbor, a more
humane system has grown up in the way of compensating workmen who are injured
while engaged in the course of their employment. The burden in the past fell upon the
employee first, but in the case of death, to those dependent upon him. As the law stood
previous to the passage of the Workmen's Compensation law, the industry was indemni-
fied by the insurance companies, and less than fifteen percent of the injured received any
damages in case of litigation, and then, after a long drawn-out litigation, which resulted
in practically nothing for the plaintiff. The injustice to the employee and waste of time
and money to the tax-payer has excited the attention of public spirited men, and it has
demonstrated that it would have been a saving of money for the tax-payer if a reasona-
ble compensation had been paid out of the state treasury, thereby preventing court cost
and injustice ....
Mandolidis, supra note 6, at 910 n.3.
2 Weisgall, Product Liability in the Workplace: The Effect of Workers' Compensation on the
Rights and Liabilities of Third Parties, 1977 Wis. L. REv. 1035, 1037 (1978).
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The extent of the problem is underscored by the fact that in a least fifty per-
cent of industrial related accidents, an employer's negligence is present." The
obvious injustice inherent in forcing a third party to subsidize a system from
which it receives little or no benefit merits attention.
In response to the problem, a trend is beginning to develop in the area of
exclusive remedy. Several states have begun to allow contribution actions for a
recovery beyond the statutory limits of workmen's compensation." West Vir-
ginia, though not yet counted among the ranks of those who have extended
liability and completely embraced the contribution doctrine in industrial acci-
dent litigation, may have taken the first step in its Sydenstricker decision. The
court did not, however, completely derogate the long established principles of
workmen's compensation. By tying third party contribution to the "deliberate
intent" doctrine developed under Mandolidis, the court limited the manner in
which liability could be extended.
But the manner in which the court construed the relevant statute31 is
more than a little confusing. The defendant employer argued that because the
plaintiff employee did not elect to sue the employer under the deliberate intent
theory, the manufacturer third party was foreclosed from such a contribution
suit. The court refused to accept that position. "We do not read the statute so
narrowly, particularly in light of the language that '[the employee, et al.] shall
also have a cause of action against the employer as if this chapter had not been
enacted.' ,132 The court interpreted the statutory language to place the deliber-
ate intent injury entirely outside the protection of the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act, regardless of the party seeking recovery. A closer look at the statute
33
in question, however, shows that the right of action belongs solely to employ-
ees, members of their immediate family and dependents. The tenuous exten-
sion of this language to include joint tortfeasors indicates the difficulty the
court faced in justifying its position.
19 Comment, -supra note 24, at 589.
30 North Carolina, California, Pennsylvania and Minnesota permit manufacturers or other
third parties to recover from a negligent employer to the extent of the employer's workmen's com-
pensation liability. In addition, Minnesota and Illinois have effectively abolished their "no-contri-
bution" rules. Weisgall, supra note 26, at 1043-46.
Some of the reasons advanced for permitting recovery beyond statutory limits, generally, are:
1) An intentional act is not within the realm of "accidents" as contemplated by the compensation
system;
2) violence on the part of the employer severs the employer-employee relationship; and
3) an intentional tort does not fall within the definition of work-related activity. Larson, supra
note 4, at § 68.11.
31 W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2 (1981).
82 Sydenstricker, 288 S.E.2d at 518.
3 The pertinent portion reads:
If injury or death results to any employee from the deliberate intention of his em-
ployer to produce such injury or death, the employee, the widow, widower, child, or
dependent of the employee shall have the privilege to take under this chapter, and shall
also have cause of action against the employer, as if this chapter had not been enacted,
for any excess of damages over the amount received or receivable under this chapter.
W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2 (1981) (emphasis added).
1983]
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While the recognized dilemma of third parties in the employment relation-
ship is an appropriate object of concern, the court may have overlooked true
legislative intent in developing its own "spirit of the law." Giving the same
rights to third parties as the court gave to injured employees in Mandolidis, is
a further extension of what is an already controversial decision. The argument
that the entire workmen's compensation system may be eroded by such judi-
cial activism is, accordingly, strengthened by Sydenstricker.
However, if Mandolidis is destined to become a permanent fixture in the
case law of this state, Sydenstricker is an inevitable corollary. If the employer's
immunity against civil actions is to be abrogated in certain special circum-
stances, that exception must apply to all parties who would have claims against
the employer. One underlying premise of Sydenstricker may be the state's gen-
eral policy of apportionment of fault through a comparative negligence sys-
tem.3 4 As the court has stated, a system of comparative negligence requires an
apportionment of the total negligence among the various parties, including the
plaintiff.35 This would imply that all involved tortfeasors be included; if not in
the original cause of action, then in an action for contribution or indemnity.
One aspect that has not been addressed by the court in its decision is
whether an employer will be able to implead a third party manufacturer in
workmen's compensation cases. By affirming its desire to fulfill the Haynes
policy of equal distribution of the liability for a suffered loss, it seems logical
for the court to extend the right of contribution to employers when the work-
place injury also involves a manufacturer's negligence. If that is indeed the
intent of the court, then a problem arises in comparing the standards applica-
ble to joint tortfeasors in arriving at a determination of the degree of fault.
Liability of an employer arises through intentional misconduct and the em-
ployer is permitted to offset receivable compensation benefits.36 But the third
party manufacturer faces strict liability in tort with no statutory policies defin-
ing the recoverable damages. 7 Therefore, in determining the relative amounts
of negligence, confusion surrounds the choice of a standard of care. How will a
jury compare wilful, wanton and reckless misconduct with strict liability in ap-
portioning fault between an employer and a manufacturer? Will a manufac-
turer receive a proportionate share of an offset of benefits receivable? These
questions remain unanswered and we must look to the court for further
guidance.
In public policy areas, Sydenstricker has redeeming value. Workmen's
compensation benefits have failed to keep pace with inflation and are arguably
inadequate. Under the exclusive remedy doctrine, the injured employee's only
option for recovery in addition to statutory benefits was a suit against a third
party. In addition, the advent of strict liability placed manufacturers in a par-
ticularly vulnerable position. Thus, injured employees found it much easier to
recover large tort awards against manufacturers. These manufacturers, who
34 See Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1979).
35 Id. at 885.
36 W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2 (1981).
37Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666 (W. Va. 1979).
[Vol. 85
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may only be partially responsible for the injury, were largely subsidizing a
compensation system from which they received no benefits. Exceptions to the
exclusive remedy doctrine should apply to all parties involved with the em-
ployer. The basic premise of these exceptions is that the employer will find it
profitable to improve the safety of the workplace. Because the employer is clos-
est to the work situation, he has the better opportunity to control dangerous
conditions and avoid unnecessary risks. By revoking exclusivity and allowing
contribution, both a safer work environment and an equitable distribution of
liability can be accomplished.
On the other hand, Sydenstricker ignores the underlying public policy of
avoiding industrial accident litigation, much like its predecessor, Mandolidis.
As Justice Neely noted in his dissent in Mandolidis:
While we may be outraged by the parsimony of the statutory compensa-
tion, we cannot be outraged at the theory of the compensation scheme, which
while denying a claimant the advantage of a common law judgment when the
employer is at fault, still has the employer pay even when the claimant is at
fault. 8
Every time an injury occurs that is not caused solely by employee negligence,
lawsuits may be instituted in the hope of recovering extensive damages. Even
if the employee chooses not to sue the employer, the employer may still be
vulnerable to third party actions. As litigation increases, smaller companies
may be more apt to settle nuisance suits to avoid the chance of a high tort
award. The cost of these suits may deplete resources which were previously
available for wages and plant modernization. Production costs will increase
and be ultimately passed along to the consumer . 3 Businesses may seek to relo-
cate in a more favorable economic climate. A careful look is needed to deter-
mine what results are desired and what methods are needed to achieve those
results. If the exceptions to the workmen's compensation system are not care-
fully controlled, the system itself may cease to serve a useful purpose. Depend-
ing upon how it is applied in future decisions and the ultimate fate of
Mandolidis, Sydenstricker could become either an important corollary to the
policy of encouraging workplace safety or merely an undesirable erosion of the
recognized value of an effective workmen's compensation system.
Perhaps an alternative is needed to the approach of ad hoc decisions on
particular aspects of worker protection. If injured workers are currently receiv-
ing inadequate compensation, benefit levels should be increased, possibly with
combined manufacturer and employer contributions into the system. Under
this option, employee recovery would be absolutely limited to the terms of the
statute, thus extending the doctrine of exclusive remedy to third party
manufacturers.
A second option would be to eliminate workmen's compensation and leave
employee recovery to the tort system. Since most of the historical reasons for
38 Mandolidis v. Elkins Industries, Inc., 246 S.E.2d 907, 922 (W. Va. 1978) (Neely, J.,
dissenting).
39 Id. at 393.
1983]
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instituting workmen's compensation are no longer present, and employees may
now effectively recover tort awards, the system may have outlived its useful-
ness. Particularly with the change in the statutory structure by first
Mandolidis and now Sydenstricker, the system has become somewhat
emasculated.
The decision to adopt either of the suggested options, or any other, should
be left to the legislature for the best possible interpretation of public policy.
Whatever the choice, it is clear that the courts will have to continue to look
closely at workplace safety and employer culpability. This will be the situation,
whether the court is continuing to reshape and redefine the existing statutes or
whether it is called upon to apply and interpret a new legislative scheme.
Richard M. Yurko, Jr.
8
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